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Abstract: We use an experiment to estimate the effect of the SEC’s Summary 
Prospectus, which simplifies mutual fund disclosure. Our subjects chose an equity 
portfolio and a bond portfolio. Subjects received either statutory prospectuses or 
Summary Prospectuses. We find no evidence that the Summary Prospectus affects 
portfolio choices. Our experiment sheds new light on the scope of investor confusion 
about sales loads. Even with a one-month investment horizon, subjects do not avoid 
loads. Subjects are either confused about loads, overlook them, or believe their chosen 
portfolio has an annualized log return that is 24 percentage points higher than the load-
minimizing portfolio. 
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  Some regulators believe that the average investor has a hard time reading the 
statutory prospectuses mutual funds distribute. In the words of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), “Prospectuses are often long… Too frequently, the 
language of prospectuses is complex and legalistic, and the presentation formats make 
little use of graphic design techniques that would contribute to readability.”
1 Partly as a 
result, two-thirds of investors do not read the prospectus before purchasing mutual fund 
shares (Investment Company Institute, 2006). 
Motivated by these concerns, the SEC recently proposed and subsequently 
adopted a new simplified disclosure document. Mutual funds now have the option of 
sending investors this two to four page document, dubbed the “Summary Prospectus,” 
instead of the statutory prospectus. The Summary Prospectus contains key information 
about the mutual fund’s investment objectives, strategies, risks, costs, and performance. 
This information can also be found in previously extant fund literature (the statutory 
prospectus, the Statement of Additional Information (SAI), and the shareholder report). 
To our knowledge, there has been no direct empirical investigation of how the 
Summary Prospectus would affect investors’ portfolio choices. This paper contributes 
towards filling this gap. We recruited 186 Harvard non-faculty, white-collar staff 
members to participate in a portfolio allocation experiment. All subjects allocated two 
portfolios: one among four actively managed equity mutual funds, and one among four 
actively managed bond mutual funds. Subjects’ payments depended on how their chosen 
portfolios actually performed subsequent to the experimental session and were 
approximately $100 per subject in expectation. 
We randomized each subject into one of three information conditions. In the first 
condition, subjects received only the funds’ statutory prospectuses. In the second 
condition, subjects received only the funds’ Summary Prospectuses, which we 
constructed using the original SEC proposal’s specifications. In the third condition, 
subjects received the Summary Prospectuses but could additionally request the statutory 
prospectuses (a request that only a few of the subjects in this condition actually made). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to be paid based on either their subsequent one-month 
portfolio return or their subsequent one-year portfolio return. 
                                                 
1 SEC Release No. 33-8861. 3 
We find that providing the Summary Prospectus does not alter subjects’ 
investment choices. Dollar-weighted average fees and past returns of mutual fund choices 
are statistically indistinguishable across the three information conditions. However, 
subjects receiving the Summary Prospectus spent less time on their investment decision. 
Thus, the principal welfare gain from the Summary Prospectus comes from allowing 
investors to spend less time and effort to arrive at the same portfolio decision they would 
have come to after reading only the statutory prospectus. Of course, the shorter Summary 
Prospectus saves paper, printing, and shipping costs as well. 
Our experiment also sheds new light on the scope of investor confusion about 
sales loads.
2 We find that subjects’ portfolio choices do not respond sensibly to loads and 
redemption fees, whether or not they receive the Summary Prospectus. Loads and 
redemption fees should be avoided to a greater degree as the investment horizon shrinks. 
Nonetheless, subjects with a one-month investment horizon chose portfolios with loads 
plus redemption fees that are on average 200 basis points higher than the load-
minimizing portfolio. This implies that subjects are either confused about loads, overlook 
them, or believe that their chosen portfolio has an annualized log return (before loads) 
that is an implausible 24 percentage points higher than the load-minimizing portfolio’s. 
In a study related to ours, Kozup, Howlett, and Pagano (2008) examine the impact 
of certain types of summary information on individuals’ attitudes towards mutual funds. 
Contrary to our results, these authors find that summary information increases subjects’ 
sensitivity to past fund performance. However, their experiment differs from ours in a 
number of respects: (1) their study was conducted before the release of the SEC proposal 
and therefore does not use the Summary Prospectus format specified in the proposal; (2) 
their summary information is much briefer and emphasizes comparisons between a fund 
and the universe of similar funds; (3) the mutual funds in their experiment are fictional; 
and (4) their subjects did not make incentivized portfolio choices but instead rated their 
investment intentions, attitudes, and perceptions of future performance and risk with 
regard to a fund using seven-point scales. 
                                                 
2 See also Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), Cronqvist (2006), and Choi, 
Laibson, and Madrian (2009) for other evidence of irrational investor behavior with respect to mutual fund 
fees. 4 
  An advantage of using laboratory experiments to evaluate policy proposals is that 
results can be produced extremely rapidly. We learned of the Summary Prospectus 
proposal in mid-January 2008, and we were able to finish collecting data and tabulate 
preliminary results by the end of February 2008, which we sent to the SEC. We believe 
that in the future, laboratory experiments should become a common part of the policy 
proposal vetting process. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides additional detail on the 
Summary Prospectus. We describe our experimental design in Section II. Section III 
discusses the experimental results, and Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Background on the Summary Prospectus 
In Release No. 33-8861, published on December 14, 2007, the SEC describes its 
Summary Prospectus proposal as follows:  
 
“We are proposing an improved mutual fund disclosure framework that is 
intended to provide investors with information that is easier to use and 
more readily accessible, while retaining the comprehensive quality of the 
information that is available today. The foundation of the proposal is the 
provision to all investors of streamlined and user-friendly information that 
is key to an investment decision.” 
 
The SEC’s aspirations for the Summary Prospectus, as described in Release No. 
33-8861, are ambitious: 
 
“We anticipate that our proposal will improve investors’ ability to make 
informed investment decisions and, therefore, lead to increased efficiency 
and competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets. Similarly, the ability of 
investors to directly locate the information they seek regarding a fund or 
funds through the use of the Internet may result in more fund investors or 
existing investors investing in more funds.” 
 
Mutual funds now have the option of satisfying their prospectus delivery 
obligations under the Securities Act of 1933 by sending a Summary Prospectus. In other 
words, investors going forward are more likely to receive only a two to four page 
document rather than a prospectus that sometimes runs hundreds of pages. Investors 5 
receiving the Summary Prospectus can also receive the longer statutory prospectus via 
mail or Internet upon request. 
Appendix A shows the sample Summary Prospectus that the SEC included in its 
proposal. The document begins with a description of how one can receive the statutory 
prospectus and other fund documents. It then displays the following information about 
the fund: 
!  Investment objective 
!  Fees and expenses 
!  Historical portfolio turnover rate 
!  Principal investment strategies 
!  Principal risks 
!  Historical returns 
!  Top ten portfolio holdings 
!  Investment advisor 
!  Portfolio manager 
!  How to purchase and sell fund shares 
!  Dividend, capital gain, and tax information 
!  A disclaimer about payments the fund may make to broker-dealers and other 
financial intermediaries 
All of this information can usually be found in union of the statutory prospectus, the 
Statement of Additional Information (SAI), and the shareholder report.  
The Summary Prospectus that was finally adopted is similar to the original 
proposal, and is described in SEC Release No. 33-8998. The amended document 
eliminates the top ten portfolio holdings and adds the ticker symbol, a slightly revised 
description of fund expenses,
3 information about where to find additional detail on the 
fund’s front-end load breakpoint discounts (based on investment amount), a description 
of the adverse tax consequences of portfolio turnover, and a stronger emphasis that 
payments from the fund to broker-dealers may create a conflict of interest. 
                                                 
3 The wording “expenses that you pay each year as a percentage of the value of your investment” replaces 
“expenses that are deducted from Fund assets.” 6 
In addition, the SEC now requires that every statutory prospectus begin with a 
section that replicates the fund’s Summary Prospectus. In this paper, we focus on the 
effect of introducing the standalone Summary Prospectus because it is the more radical 
change. The summary section added to the statutory prospectus would likely have an 
effect that is directionally similar to the Summary Prospectus, but attenuated because it is 
part of a long document that often goes unread. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
In February 2008, we recruited 186 non-faculty Harvard employees drawn from 
the ranks of the administrative, professional, clerical, and technical staff.
4 We paid 
subjects a $20 participation fee and promised them an additional payment that depended 
on their investment decisions, as described below. 
Upon entering the study, subjects received instructions that they were going to 
make investment choices for two hypothetical $100,000 portfolios. One portfolio could 
only be invested in stock mutual funds; the other could only be invested in bond mutual 
funds. We would then select one portfolio based on whether the high temperature at 
Logan Airport on a future date was even or odd. We would pay subjects 0.1% of the 
selected portfolio’s value at the end of the investment period. For example, if the 
portfolio’s terminal value was $100,000, subjects would receive a $100 portfolio-based 
payment. 
Subjects entered their portfolio allocations onto choice sheets. One sheet listed a 
menu of four equity mutual funds, and the other listed a menu of four bond mutual funds. 
Appendix B reproduces an example of a choice sheet. 
Each choice sheet was one page long and had three sections. The first section 
explained the purpose of the experiment—to allocate 100,000 experimental dollars 
among the four listed equity or bond mutual funds—and described the payment scheme. 
The second section gave a numerical example of how the portfolio payout would be 
calculated. The third section contained a matrix in which participants entered their 
                                                 
4 We actually recruited 314 subjects, but we discard the data of 125 subjects because errors in the 
experimental materials distributed to those subjects make interpreting their choices problematic. We 
discard an additional three subjects in order to make the frequency of menus in each condition equal. Our 
results do not qualitatively change if we analyze the larger sample of subjects. 7 
investment allocation. Participants were instructed to allocate their investment across as 
many or as few funds as they desired, subject to two constraints: (1) they had to allocate 
exactly $100,000 in total, and (2) they had to satisfy the minimum opening balance 
requirement for any fund to which they made an allocation. We imposed the latter 
restriction to mimic the constraints that an investor would face when making a real 
investment in these funds. The minimum opening balance for each fund was listed next to 
the column where participants were to write their selected allocation. 
We randomly assigned subjects to one of three information conditions. In the 
“Prospectus” condition, subjects received only the eight funds’ statutory prospectuses 
when making their investment decision. In the “Summary Prospectus” condition, subjects 
received only Summary Prospectuses which we constructed for the funds based upon the 
sample Summary Prospectus provided in the SEC’s proposal. (Appendix C describes in 
more detail how we constructed these Summary Prospectuses.) In the “Summary 
Prospectus+” condition, subjects initially received only the Summary Prospectuses but 
could also receive the statutory prospectuses upon request. This latter condition was 
designed to mimic the SEC proposal, which allows firms to distribute only the Summary 
Prospectus while giving investors the option to request the statutory prospectus if desired. 
Half of subjects made the equity allocation before the bond allocation; the other 
half made the allocations in reverse order. At any given moment in the experiment, 
subjects possessed only one investment choice sheet and one set of fund documents. That 
is, when subjects were making their equity allocation, they only possessed materials 
relevant to the equity funds available to them. Similarly, subjects only possessed 
materials relevant to bond funds when making their bond allocation.  
We also randomly varied (independently of information condition) the subjects’ 
investment horizon. Half of subjects would receive their portfolio payments based upon 
what a real-life investor would receive if he bought their selected portfolio at 3 P.M. on 
February 29, 2008 and sold it at 3 P.M. on March 31, 2008. The other half would receive 
their portfolio payments assuming the investor bought their selected portfolio at 3 P.M. 
on February 29, 2008 and sold it at 3 P.M. on February 28, 2009.
5 The investment 
                                                 
5 Because February 28, 2009 is a Saturday, the sale would actually get executed on March 2, 2009. Hence, 
the investment horizon was slightly over one year. Charging back-end loads assuming that the investment 8 
horizon relevant for the subject was displayed on the choice sheet. We promised to pay 
subjects soon after their investment period ended. 
  Finally, we randomly assigned subjects (independently of the other two 
randomization dimensions) to receive one of ten menus of mutual funds. Each of the ten 
menus consists of four equity funds and four bond funds. To populate the menus, we 
began by randomly selecting ten equity funds and ten bond funds from the CRSP mutual 
fund universe that satisfied the following criteria: (1) they had a share class with a front-
end load (Class A) and a share class with no front-end load (Class C), (2) they were 
active in 2007, (3) their S&P style code was Equity Large Cap Growth, Equity Large Cap 
Value, or Equity Large Cap Blend for equity funds and Fixed Income High Yield for 
bond funds, (4) they were not a “fund of funds” or an index fund, (5) they were available 
to retail investors, (6) they were open to new investments in 2007, (7) they reported 
historical return information, and (8) they did not have special characteristics like a 
religious affiliation, social investment objectives, investments limited to a single sector, 
or a tax-managed strategy. 
  We then created ten distinct menus of funds from these ten equity and ten bond 
funds. The first five menus satisfied the following requirements: (1) each fund appeared 
in exactly two of the five menus, with one menu offering the Class A shares of the fund, 
and the second offering the Class C shares of the fund, (2) the same fund did not appear 
twice in the same menu (e.g. Fund 1’s Class A and Fund 1’s Class C were not in the same 
menu), and (3) every menu offered two fund share classes with front-end loads (Class A) 
and two fund share classes with no front-end loads (Class C). The next five menus were 
created based on the first five menus by inverting the share classes of each menu. For 
example, if one menu offered Bond Fund 1 – Class A, Bond Fund 2 – Class C, Bond 
Fund 3 – Class A, and Bond Fund 4 – Class C, its inverted menu would offer Bond Fund 
1 – Class C, Bond Fund 2 – Class A, Bond Fund 3 – Class C, and Bond Fund 4 – Class 
A. 
  Unfortunately, there were errors in the Summary Prospectuses we constructed for 
one equity fund and one bond fund. We therefore drop subjects offered these two funds 
                                                                                                                                                 
horizon was exactly one year does not qualitatively change our conclusions about how the Summary 
Prospectus affected fees paid. 9 
from our analysis, whether or not they received a Summary Prospectus.
6 Because four out 
of the ten menus we constructed contained a problematic fund, our sample is reduced by 
40%. Our results do not qualitatively change if we include subjects who received the 
problematic menus. 
  Table 1 displays features of the eighteen mutual funds that remain in our sample. 
Front-end loads for Class A shares range between 1.75% and 5.75%. There is almost no 
variation in back-end loads for Class C shares; all the funds except one charge a 1% load 
if the shares are held for less than 12 months, although some funds count the beginning of 
the calendar month or calendar year of purchase as the start of the holding period, rather 
than the exact day of purchase. Some funds also charge an additional redemption fee of 
up to 2% if shares are sold within a shorter time frame. (For ease of exposition, we will 
hereafter refer to loads and redemption fees collectively as “loads.”) Expense ratios lie 
between 0.80% and 1.53% for Class A shares and between 1.55% and 2.18% for Class C 
shares. As expected, there is more cross-sectional variation in the equity fund returns than 
the bond fund returns. The standard deviation of one-year past returns is 6.99% across 
equity funds and 2.03% across bond funds. For the longest-horizon past return reported in 
the prospectus, the standard deviation is 4.06% across equity funds and 3.14% across 
bond funds. 
  In total, there were 36 experimental conditions: three information treatments ! 
two investment horizons ! six fund menus. There are an equal number of subjects within 
each cell. In particular, each menu ! investment horizon combination appears the same 
number of times within each information condition. Therefore, we can compare mean 
allocations across information conditions without worrying that menu or investment 
horizon effects are confounding these comparisons. 
After submitting their portfolio choices, subjects filled out a questionnaire that 
included demographic and financial literacy questions. 
 
III. Results 
  Table 2 shows the characteristics of our subject sample for each information 
condition. Subjects are 39 years old on average, and 37% are male. Almost all subjects 
                                                 
6 Every subject who was offered one problematic fund was offered the other problematic fund as well. 10 
are college graduates, and over half have some graduate education. About a fifth are able 
to correctly identify the types of securities a money market fund holds when asked a 
multiple-choice question modeled on a question in the John Hancock Eighth Defined 
Contribution Plan Survey.
7 This compares favorably to the 8% of the John Hancock 
sample who were able to answer the question correctly. Thus, our subjects have higher 
levels of educational attainment and financial literacy than the overall U.S. population. 
  Our subjects also understand the concept of diversification. On average, they rate 
a typical Fortune 500 stock as riskier than a U.S. equity mutual fund on a five-point scale. 
In contrast, John Hancock respondents on average thought that the stock of their own 
company was less risky than an equity mutual fund. However, this comparison is 
potentially confounded by the fact that John Hancock respondents were asked about the 
stock of their own employer, whereas our subjects were asked about the stock of a typical 
Fortune 500 company. 
  Despite being more financially literate than the average American, most of our 
subjects do not have much confidence in their investment abilities. About half describe 
themselves as an investor who is “less than knowledgeable” or “not at all 
knowledgeable.” This lack of financial knowledge is a common finding across surveys. 
For example, Lusardi, Keller, and Keller (forthcoming) surveyed employees at a non-
profit institution, and 38% of respondents reported that insufficient financial knowledge 
was a problem in their financial decisions. 
  Comparing across information conditions, the prospectus-only group is slightly 
more male than the others. Subjects in the prospectus-only group are also more likely to 
have a graduate degree, although subjects in the other groups are more likely to have at 
least some graduate school education. Controlling for gender and educational attainment 
through dummy variables in a regression does not qualitatively change our results. 
  Table 3 shows how the Summary Prospectus affected investment decisions. 
Because very few of the subjects in the Summary Prospectus+ condition asked to see a 
statutory prospectus, we pool the Summary Prospectus and Summary Prospectus+ 
conditions in the remaining analysis. The table reveals no statistically significant 
                                                 
7 The question text is, “Which of the following types of investments are found in a money market fund? 
(You may check more than one type.)” The possible choices are short term U.S. government bonds, 
corporate bonds, stocks, and none of the above. 11 
differences in average front-end load, back-end load, expense ratio, total fees, past one-
year return, or past long-horizon return (defined as the longest-horizon past return 
reported in the fund’s prospectus) when subjects receive the Summary Prospectus instead 
of the statutory prospectus. The point estimates indicate that in general, subjects receiving 
the Summary Prospectus pay more in fund fees and choose funds with higher past 
returns, although the bond portfolios have some point estimates that go in the opposite 
direction. 
  One important test of sensible investment behavior is an increasing avoidance of 
loads as the investment horizon shrinks. With a one-year investment horizon, a fund with 
a 2% load would be preferred over a no-load fund with an equivalent expense ratio if the 
ratio of one plus the load fund’s annual pre-load return to one plus the no-load fund’s 
annual return is greater than 1/0.98 = 1.02. With a one-month investment horizon, the 
ratio would have to be greater than (1/0.98)
12 = 1.27. In other words, the load fund is 
preferred under a one-month investment horizon if it has an annualized log return that is 
larger than the no-load fund’s annualized log return by at least log(1.27) = 24%—an 
implausibly large amount to rationally expect. 
Table 3 shows that subjects generally do not avoid loads in the one-month 
condition. Pooling the equity and bond allocation decisions, subjects chose funds with an 
average total load of 3.00% in the conditions with an investment horizon of one month, 
which is 200 basis points higher than the lowest available to them. To not minimize loads 
is to bet that one’s chosen portfolio has a log pre-load return that is (implausibly) 24 
percentage points per year higher than the load-minimizing portfolio.
8 With a one-month 
horizon, minimizing loads is the only sensible strategy.  
Does the Summary Prospectus affect the relationship between investment horizon 
and loads paid? Table 3 shows that loads are higher in the one-month condition than in 
the one-year condition, which is to be expected because back-end loads are 0% for most 
funds at the one-year horizon but not the one-month horizon. However, the amount by 
which loads increase from the one-year horizon to the one-month horizon is unaffected 
by the Summary Prospectus. For equity portfolios, subjects receiving the Summary 
                                                 
8 This calculation also takes into account expense ratios, assuming that one-twelfth of the annual expense 
ratio is charged each month. When more than one fund shares the minimum load, we equally weight the 
load-minimizing portfolio. 12 
Prospectus exhibit a 14 basis point smaller increase than subjects receiving the statutory 
prospectus; the reverse holds for bond portfolios, where subjects receiving the Summary 
Prospectus exhibit a 27 basis point larger increase than subjects receiving the statutory 
prospectus. None of these differences are statistically significant. 
In summary, there is no evidence that the Summary Prospectus causes subjects to 
respond to mutual fund fees more optimally. 
We can also analyze whether subjects who received Summary Prospectuses 
instead of statutory prospectuses differed in the extent to which their portfolios were 
concentrated in certain mutual funds as opposed to evenly spread among four mutual 
funds, as might be implied by a naïve diversification strategy (Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001). For our measure of portfolio concentration, we use the Euclidean distance between 
(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) and the portfolio as represented by a point in 
4 ! . This measure 
ranges from 0 (portfolio allocated equally across four funds) to  " 0.87 " (portfolio 
allocated entirely to a single fund). For equity portfolios, the mean concentration measure 
for subjects receiving Summary Prospectuses was 0.396 (s.e. 0.020), and the mean 
concentration measure for subjects receiving statutory prospectuses was also 0.396 (s.e. 
0.030). The analogous means for bond portfolios were 0.414 (s.e. 0.023) and 0.408 (s.e. 
0.031). Neither difference is statistically significant. Thus, it does not seem that the 
Summary Prospectus led subjects to change the extent to which they deviate from the 
naïve diversification strategy of equal allocations to four funds. 
There is also no strong evidence that the Summary Prospectus made subjects feel 
better about their investment decision. Table 4 shows the distribution of answers to two 
sets of questions subjects answered after making their portfolio allocations. The first set 
of questions asked—separately for the equity portfolio and the bond portfolio—how 
likely subjects were to change their allocation if they consulted a professional investment 
advisor. The second set asked—again separately for the two portfolios—how confident 
subjects were that the allocation was the right one for them. None of the answer 
frequencies differ significantly between the prospectus-only and Summary Prospectus 
conditions. 
  Even though the actual quality of portfolio choices appears to be unaffected by 
the Summary Prospectus, subjects who received the Summary Prospectus spent 13 
significantly less time on average making their two portfolio allocations—only 22.5 
minutes, versus 31.2 minutes for subjects who received the statutory prospectuses.
9 
Therefore, the Summary Prospectus’s welfare benefit operates through the time-saving 
channel, rather than the portfolio-improvement channel. 
  Table 5 shows how participants rated the importance of various factors for their 
investment choice on a five-point scale. Fund performance over the past year, fund 
performance since inception, and investment objectives are ranked as the three most 
important factors across all information conditions. However, subjects receiving the 
Summary Prospectus tended to rank past one-year performance as more important and 
fund performance since inception as a little less important. A desire to diversify across 
funds and the quality of the documents explaining the mutual fund were also ranked as 
somewhat important. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
We have evaluated the effect of simplifying mutual fund disclosure by studying 
the effect of the Summary Prospectus recently adopted by the SEC. To determine the 
causal impact of this simplified document, we use randomized trials in which different 
groups of investors are given different types of prospectuses. 
On the positive side, the Summary Prospectus reduces the amount of time spent 
on the investment decision without adversely affecting portfolio quality. On the negative 
side, the Summary Prospectus does not change, let alone improve, portfolio choices. 
Hence, simpler disclosure does not appear to be a useful channel for making mutual fund 
investors more sophisticated and for creating competitive pricing pressure on mutual fund 
companies.  
Our experiments also shed light on the scope of investor confusion regarding 
loads. Even when our subjects have a one month investment horizon—where minimizing 
loads is the only sensible strategy—they do not avoid loads. In our experiment, subjects 
chose funds with an average load of 3.00% in the conditions with an investment horizon 
                                                 
9 The typical amount of time subjects spent on the experimental task is not dramatically dissimilar from the 
amount of time they might spend choosing a portfolio for their real-world savings. In a survey of non-
faculty employees at the University of Southern California, Benartzi and Thaler (1999) found that the 
majority of respondents spent an hour or less on the portfolio allocation decision for their defined 
contribution plan. 14 
of one month. This choice is like betting that the chosen portfolio has an (implausible) 
excess log return relative to the load-minimizing portfolio of 24 percentage points per 
year. We conclude that our subjects either don’t understand how loads work or don’t take 
them into account. We also conclude that the Summary Prospectus does nothing to 
alleviate these kinds of errors. 
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Appendix B. Sample Experimental Investment Choice Sheet 
Choose a stock mutual fund portfolio 
Please allocate $100,000 among the four stock mutual funds listed below. You may choose to allocate 
all $100,000 to one fund or allocate your investment evenly or unevenly across as many funds as you 
like.   
 
If your stock portfolio is chosen for payment based on Logan Airport’s February 28 temperature, we 
will calculate how much money a real investor would get back if he or she sent $100,000 to the stock 
funds  below  according  to  the  allocation  that  you  choose,  assuming  that  each  fund  received  the 
investment at 3:00 P.M. on February 29, 2008, and the investments were sold at 3:00 P.M. on March 31, 
2008. We will pay you 0.1% of whatever the investment is worth at the end of the investment period.  
 
 
PAYOFF CALCULATION EXAMPLES 
Example #1:  Suppose selling your hypothetical investment on March 31, 2008 would give you 
$110,000. Then we would pay you (in addition to the $20 participation payment you will receive today) 
$110, which is 0.1% of $110,000. 
 
Example #2:  Suppose selling your hypothetical investment on March 31, 2008 would give you $85,000. 
Then we would pay you (in addition to the $20 participation payment you will receive today) $85, which 
is 0.1% of $85,000. 
 
 
Below is the menu of mutual funds from which you may choose.   
!  Write the dollar amount you would like to allocate to each fund in the last column 
!  You may invest in as many or as few funds as you choose 
!  Please be careful to allocate a total of exactly $100,000 
!  If  you  put  money  in  a  fund,  that  amount  must  satisfy  the  minimum  opening 
allocation requirement 
 
 
Stock Mutual Fund  Symbol  Minimum Opening Allocation 
if Buying Shares in Fund 
Your Allocation in Dollars 
(column must sum to $100,000)
SunAmerica Growth and 
Income - Class A  SEIAX  $500    
American Century 
Fundamental Equity - Class 
A 
AFDAX  $2500   
MFS Value Fund - Class C  MEICX  $1000    
Dreyfus Premier Core Value 
Fund - Class C  DCVCX  $1000    
! Information about these 4 stock mutual funds is attached " 
Any portfolio allocations which violate minimum opening allocation requirements or which fail to total 
$100,000 will be ineligible for the investment payout.   19 
Appendix C. Creating the Summary Prospectus 
To create the Summary Prospectus documents used experiment, we attempted to 
mimic as closely as possible the sample Summary Prospectus provided by the SEC. In 
the instances of ambiguity, we made a few decisions and assumptions: 
!  We limited the number of share classes included in the Summary Prospectus to 
five due to space limitations. If a fund had more than five share classes, we chose 
the first five share classes presented in the prospectus, while ensuring that the 
relevant Class A and Class C shares were included.  
!  When possible, we used the exact text from the statutory prospectus in the 
“Investment Objective,” “Principal Investment Strategies,” “Principal Risks,” and 
“Portfolio Manager” sections of the Summary Prospectus. In instances where the 
descriptions provided in the statutory prospectus were too long, we extracted the 
most relevant sentences.  
!  For the sake of not introducing any new information, we generally did not include 
any information in the Summary Prospectuses that could not be found in the 
statutory prospectus, the Statement of Additional Information (SAI), annual 
report, or most recent shareholder report distributed to subjects. The only 
exception was the data on top ten portfolio holdings. In instances that funds did 
not provide this information in their fund literature, we used information from the 
Google Finance website. 
!  Below the “Shareholder Fees” table we included a footnote about additional 
restrictions relevant to the profiled share classes, such as minimum investment 
amounts and whether share classes were restricted to institutional investors or 
retirement plans. We did so because fees are often considerably lower for 
institutions, retirement plans, and large investment amounts. We did not want 
experimental subjects to think that we were systematically offering them the least 
attractive share classes available, when in fact we were offering them share 
classes consistent with their hypothetical principal amount and retail status. 
Furthermore, we believed that in any final regulation, the SEC would require the 
Summary Prospectus to disclose these restrictions. 20 
!  Some funds did not decompose 12b-1 fees into “Distribution” and “Service” fees. 
When this occurred, the total amount of 12b-1 fees was listed under 
“Distribution” fees. Table 1. Mutual Fund Shares Offered in the Experiment 
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